[Internal-cg] ICANN Board Concerns about CCWG Proposed Model -- My Assessment

[Paul Wilson]

Hi Keith, Milton et al,

I said last night that the ICG should engage somehow in the CCWG 
discussion, so I’m happy to see this and to provide some comments on 
this thread.

1. There is high risk associated with CCWG proposal because it offers a 
substantially different Governance structure. It cannot be proved safe 
(as Milton said), which is exactly the problem when it is so far removed 
from the current structure.  And it seems that time has run out to 
achieve agreement among the CCWG, let alone with others who need to be 
convinced.

2. On the other hand ICANN’s current model IS tested, by way of 15 
years of operations.  This was surely not an entire waste of time!  If, 
based on that experience, the community can identify a set of changes to 
improve it in reliable ways, specifically by providing (for the first 
time?) properly enforceable accountability mechanisms, then that is 
surely worth considering as a less risky option, and maybe the only 
achievable option now.

3. There are quite a few risks as Milton said, but the risk of 
(un)acceptability of the final model is perfectly real and must be 
addressed objectively.  I don’t think this can be characterised as 
“cynical”.

4. Much about the “sole membership” structure is yet to be 
determined, but cannot be determined in the time available. For this 
reason it is not necessary to be for or against it; but rather to ensure 
that a discussion and decision about this development can take
place in the future, and be enforceable if and when that happens.

5. This is not about the board, and it is not only about 
explain/understanding it;  it is about agreeing on a workable plan which 
can be understood by all concerned, and also being able to implement it 
in the time available.

The board has stated clearly that they do not oppose the Single Member 
model per se.  Unless someone wants to question them on some 
demonstrated contradiction, isn’t it better that we accept their 
assurance, and hold them to it later?

As I said last night I think we do have a role and responsibility here. 
We at the ICG should be able to discuss this in an objective and sincere 
way. Unless we are happy to see the work we have done go down the drain, 
I really think we should get moving.

Paul.




On 9 Oct 2015, at 7:48, Mueller, Milton L wrote:

> I think Keith's summary is an accurate summary of the board's 
> position, but I would add the following caveats:
>
> 1. It's a tragedy that what we are getting and discussing at this time 
> is the board's position only, instead of a comprehensive analysis of 
> the public comments as a whole. The board is but one organization out 
> of nearly 100 who commented.
>
> 2. Many of the board positions are obviously without merit, e.g.:
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> -- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership, is 
>> new,
>> untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the limited time 
>> available
>> to meet the September 2016 date.
>
> This argument asks one to prove a negative (X will not be captured). 
> Can't be done.
>
>> -- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body 
>> is
>> potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to sell 
>> as not
>> introducing risk at a delicate time.
>
> California Nonprofit public benefit corps are assumed to have members. 
> What is "untested" is a Cal nonprofit WITHOUT either members or NTIA 
> oversight
>
> The risk argument is especially cynical. What could be riskier than 
> inadequate community empowerment mechanisms over an ICANN that has no 
> USG oversight?
>
>> -- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a 
>> commensurate level of
>> accountability, and the current SOs and ACs do not have sufficient
>> accountability at this time.
>
> Facepalm. All of the representatives in the SOs are elected, unlike 
> ICANN's board, and membership in these entities is open subject to 
> reasonable and accountable eligibility requirements.
>
>> -- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside 
>> and from
>> within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear safeguards is 
>> problematic.
>
> There are all kinds of safeguards; requirements for supermajorities, 
> an independent review process; this is just ICANN legal fearing it 
> will lose control
>
>> -- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not 
>> balanced if it
>> doesn't include all community members, and two groups (SSAC and 
>> RSSAC)
>> have said they want to remain advisory.
>
> And they should remain advisory. ACs are not policy making entities, 
> they are appointed by the board, and their composition overlaps with 
> the SOs significantly.
>
>> -- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a 
>> voting
>> structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder model.
>
> The level of hypocrisy in this one is so great I am unable to respond 
> in language that would be suitable for a public forum
>
>> -- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to
>> explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes 
>> that
>> are more easily implemented and understood.
>
> I think the board understands the proposal all too well. They see a 
> loss of power, and are resisting it to the death, full stop.
>
>> -- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance restructuring 
>> will
>> suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a politically risky message 
>> going into
>> the transition.
>
> ROFL.
>
>
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________________________________________________________________________
Paul Wilson, Director-General, APNIC                        dg at apnic.net
http://www.apnic.net                                            @apnicdg