[Internal-cg] ICANN Board Concerns about CCWG Proposed Model -- My Assessment

Sat Oct 10 13:57:24 UTC 2015

My point was that asking reformers to prove that "the new ICANN cannot be captured" creates a requirement that is not meaningful and just acts as a blanket excuse for the ICANN board's lack of accountability. 

Any reforms that shift power from the board to its purported community will be untested and thus will create risks. And leaving the current structures in place without NTIA is also new, also untested, also creates risks. 

--MM

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Wilson [mailto:pwilson at apnic.net]
> Sent: Friday, October 9, 2015 9:49 PM
> To: Mueller, Milton L <milton.mueller at pubpolicy.gatech.edu>
> Cc: Drazek, Keith <kdrazek at verisign.com>; internal-cg at ianacg.org
> Subject: Re: [Internal-cg] ICANN Board Concerns about CCWG Proposed
> Model -- My Assessment
> 
> Hi Milton,
> 
> It honestly seemed to me that you were agreeing with Keith, in saying that we
> cannot prove that the new ICANN will not be captured.  Which led me to
> suggest that the risk of the unknown will increase with the number of
> unknowns.  Better the devil we know.
> 
> But please, before you jump on that, note my second point.  I did not and do
> not suggest for a moment that we can try to proceed “without sufficient
> accountability reforms”.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Paul.
> 
> 
> 
> On 10 Oct 2015, at 8:00, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
> 
> > Paul
> >
> >> 1. There is high risk associated with CCWG proposal because it offers
> >> a substantially different Governance structure. It cannot be proved
> >> safe (as Milton said), which is exactly the problem when it is so far
> >> removed from the
> >
> > I really have to object to the way you are representing what I said.
> > This business about the CCWG proposal being "untested" and ICANN being
> > "tested" is the worst argument I have heard in ICANN in a long time,
> > and that's saying a lot.
> >
> > ICANN minus NTIA has not been tested. Verisign as RZM without NTIA has
> > not been tested.
> >
> > What HAS been tested and proved multiple times are the numerous
> > accountability problems and outright abuses that have occurred in
> > ICANN's policy process even with NTIA oversight. ICANN without
> > sufficient accountability reforms will not get through the US Congress
> > approval process.
> >
> > What we are seeing now is a board that is used to having all the power
> > revolt in panic at the idea that it really has to become accountable
> > to its community. It's as simple as that. Yes, the CCWG plan can be
> > improved and there are some issues even I have with it, but those
> > problems can be and would have been fixed had the board not panicked.
> > Now the Chair of ICANN's board is telling the community "take it or
> > leave it" to a proposal that they concocted unilaterally. A consensual
> > solution is seriously threatened at this point, and that can not only
> > scuttle the transition but have long term consequences for the
> > credibility and legitimacy of  IG institutions.
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> current structure.  And it seems that time has run out to achieve
> >> agreement among the CCWG, let alone with others who need to be
> >> convinced.
> >>
> >> 2. On the other hand ICANN’s current model IS tested, by way of 15
> >> years of operations.  This was surely not an entire waste of time!
> >> If, based on that experience, the community can identify a set of
> >> changes to improve it in reliable ways, specifically by providing
> >> (for the first
> >> time?) properly enforceable accountability mechanisms, then that is
> >> surely worth considering as a less risky option, and maybe the only
> >> achievable option now.
> >>
> >> 3. There are quite a few risks as Milton said, but the risk of
> >> (un)acceptability of the final model is perfectly real and must be
> >> addressed objectively.
> >> I don’t
> >> think this can be characterised as “cynical”.
> >>
> >> 4. Much about the “sole membership” structure is yet to be
> >> determined, but cannot be determined in the time available. For this
> >> reason it is not necessary to be for or against it; but rather to
> >> ensure that a discussion and decision about this development can take
> >> place in the future, and be enforceable if and when that happens.
> >>
> >> 5. This is not about the board, and it is not only about
> >> explain/understanding it;  it is about agreeing on a workable plan
> >> which can be understood by all concerned, and also being able to
> >> implement it in the time available.
> >>
> >> The board has stated clearly that they do not oppose the Single
> >> Member model per se.  Unless someone wants to question them on some
> >> demonstrated contradiction, isn’t it better that we accept their
> >> assurance, and hold them to it later?
> >>
> >> As I said last night I think we do have a role and responsibility
> >> here.
> >> We at the ICG should be able to discuss this in an objective and
> >> sincere way.
> >> Unless we are happy to see the work we have done go down the drain, I
> >> really think we should get moving.
> >>
> >> Paul.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 9 Oct 2015, at 7:48, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
> >>
> >>> I think Keith's summary is an accurate summary of the board's
> >>> position, but I would add the following caveats:
> >>>
> >>> 1. It's a tragedy that what we are getting and discussing at this
> >>> time is the board's position only, instead of a comprehensive
> >>> analysis of the public comments as a whole. The board is but one
> >>> organization out of nearly 100 who commented.
> >>>
> >>> 2. Many of the board positions are obviously without merit, e.g.:
> >>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> -- Introducing a different governance structure, i.e. membership,
> >>>> is new, untested, and cannot be proven to resist capture in the
> >>>> limited time available to meet the September 2016 date.
> >>>
> >>> This argument asks one to prove a negative (X will not be captured).
> >>> Can't be done.
> >>>
> >>>> -- Shifting authority from the Board to an untested membership body
> >>>> is potentially destabilizing and will be difficult or impossible to
> >>>> sell as not introducing risk at a delicate time.
> >>>
> >>> California Nonprofit public benefit corps are assumed to have
> >>> members.
> >>> What is "untested" is a Cal nonprofit WITHOUT either members or NTIA
> >>> oversight
> >>>
> >>> The risk argument is especially cynical. What could be riskier than
> >>> inadequate community empowerment mechanisms over an ICANN that
> has
> >> no
> >>> USG oversight?
> >>>
> >>>> -- If we're going to shift authority, we must also shift a
> >>>> commensurate level of accountability, and the current SOs and ACs
> >>>> do not have sufficient accountability at this time.
> >>>
> >>> Facepalm. All of the representatives in the SOs are elected, unlike
> >>> ICANN's board, and membership in these entities is open subject to
> >>> reasonable and accountable eligibility requirements.
> >>>
> >>>> -- ICANN and its SOs/ACs need to be safe from capture from outside
> >>>> and from within; empowering the SOs and ACs without clear
> >>>> safeguards is problematic.
> >>>
> >>> There are all kinds of safeguards; requirements for supermajorities,
> >>> an independent review process; this is just ICANN legal fearing it
> >>> will lose control
> >>>
> >>>> -- Concentrating power in a new "sole membership" body is not
> >>>> balanced if it doesn't include all community members, and two
> >>>> groups (SSAC and
> >>>> RSSAC)
> >>>> have said they want to remain advisory.
> >>>
> >>> And they should remain advisory. ACs are not policy making entities,
> >>> they are appointed by the board, and their composition overlaps with
> >>> the SOs significantly.
> >>>
> >>>> -- Shifting from consensus-based decision-making to reliance on a
> >>>> voting structure is not consistent with the multi-stakeholder
> >>>> model.
> >>>
> >>> The level of hypocrisy in this one is so great I am unable to
> >>> respond in language that would be suitable for a public forum
> >>>
> >>>> -- The CCWG recommendation is too complex and difficult to
> >>>> explain/understand, so we need to make smaller, incremental changes
> >>>> that are more easily implemented and understood.
> >>>
> >>> I think the board understands the proposal all too well. They see a
> >>> loss of power, and are resisting it to the death, full stop.
> >>>
> >>>> -- A recommendation requiring a substantial governance
> >>>> restructuring will suggest that ICANN is currently broken -- a
> >>>> politically risky message going into the transition.
> >>>
> >>> ROFL.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> Internal-cg mailing list
> >>> Internal-cg at mm.ianacg.org
> >>> http://mm.ianacg.org/mailman/listinfo/internal-cg_ianacg.org
> >>
> >>
> _________________________________________________________________
> >> _______
> >> Paul Wilson, Director-General, APNIC
> >> dg at apnic.net
> >> http://www.apnic.net
> >> @apnicdg
> 
> _________________________________________________________________
> _______
> Paul Wilson, Director-General, APNIC                        dg at apnic.net
> http://www.apnic.net                                            @apnicdg